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opportunity to cross-examine as long as adverse evidence to be presented is available for inspection. This access to cross-examination is
adequate because "the requirement . . . is not that the witness be
cross-examined, but only that the opponent have opportunity to crossexamine." 52 Thus, the Perales decision represents a sound liberalization of administrative procedure by a realistic appraisal of the probative worth of hearsay in view of the attendant circumstances. The
ruling should increase the efficiency of the administrative process
while preserving procedural safeguards.

D.

RIGHT

To A COMPARATIVE HEARING

In Citizens Communications Center v. FCC'the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that an FCC policy statement 2 which denied full comparative hearings 3 to mutually exclusive4
52. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence ii the Administrative Process, 55 HARy.
L. REv.364, 380 (1942). See generally The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 3,
328 (1971).
1.447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), noted in Comment, Implications of Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1500 (1971). The Citizens Communications Center
(CCC) and Black Efforts for Soul in Television (BEST), a co-petitioner, are non-profit citizens'
groups organized for the purpose of representing the public interest in proceedings before the
FCC. After the Commission had denied their request to reconsider its 1970 Policy Statement,
discussed at notes 7-11 infra and accompanying text, see Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24
F.C.C.2d 383, 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1902 (1970), CCC and BEST petitioned the court of
appeals for review of the statement and related opinions and orders of the Commission. 447
F.2d at 1202 n.2; Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 355, 18 P & F RADIO REG.
2D 1523 (1970). The court consolidated this petition with petitions to review the 1970 statement
filed by Hampton Roads Television Corp. and Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc., two
applicants for television channels who had filed in competition with renewal applicants. In a
third consolidated case, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction at the district court level, CCC and
BEST sought to enjoin the FCC from making any change in the standards applicable to
comparative broadcast license renewal hearings without first giving all interested parties notice
and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970). In light of the decision discussed herein, the court held that this case was moot.
Two intervenors, RKO General, Inc. and WTAR Radio TV Corp., filed briefs defending the
policy statement and subsequent FCC actions.
2. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants [1970 Policy Statement], 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901 (1970).
3. A comparative hearing involves a determination of the relative qualifications of two or
more applicants. All parties participating in such a comparative determination have the right
to support their allegations by argument and by proof, if necessary. Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
4. Applications are mutually exclusive "if the grant of one effectively precludes the other."
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327,330 (1945). This situation arises most commonly
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applicants seeking to oust incumbent licensees in radio or television

license renewal proceedings violated section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, 5 as interpreted in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC.6 The FCC policy statement provided that if an applicant seeking renewal of a radio or television license could show that his program service had substantially met the needs and interests of his

broadcasting area 7 and that his service was not otherwise characterized by serious deficiencies, 8 his license would be renewed, irrespective
of the qualifications of other applicants. Under this policy the performance of the incumbent was considered during the first part of a
two-phase hearing 9 and challengers were permitted to appear only for

the limited purpose of pointing out the incumbent's deficiencies." If
when only one frequency is available, and the granting of one such application effectively results
in a denial of all others. When a large number of mutually exclusive applications are received,
the best solution is often to consider them all in one proceeding. See, e.g., Renewal of Radio
and Television Licenses [New York-New Jersey], 18 F.C.C.2d 268 (1969). See generally I
DAVIS § 8.12.
5. Communications Act of 1934, § 309(e), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). When an application
for a broadcasting license is not initially granted pursuant to § 309(a), see notes 20-23 infra
and accompanying text, the Commission must "formally designate the application for hearing
on the ground or reasons then obtaining . . . . Any hearing subsequently held upon such
application shall be a full hearing in which the applicant and all other parties in interest shall
" Id. But see United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
be permitted to participate ....
U.S. 192 (1956); Guinan v. FCC, 297 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Simmons v. FCC, 145 F.2d
578 (D.C. Cir. 1964). These cases hold that when an applicant fails to comply with FCC rules
or is basically unqualified, no hearing need be held.
6. 326 U.S. 327 (1945). See text accompanying notes 27-30 infra.
7. The FCC explains that the term "substantially" is used in the sense of a "strong,"
"solid" performance as contrasted with service only minimally meeting the needs and interests
of its area. 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d at 425 n.l, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1904
n. 1.
8. Examples of serious deficiencies are rigged quiz shows, violations of the fairness doctrine,
over-commercialization, the broadcasting of lotteries, violation of racial discrimination rules,
2
and fraudulent practices with respect to advertisers. Id. at 426, 18 P & F RADIO REG. D at
1905.
9. The first phase involved consideration of the incumbent's renewal application. During
this phase the incumbent had an opportunity to demonstrate that his service during the preceding license period was "substantial." Id. at 425, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1904; see note 7
supra. If the Commission decided that the incumbent's service was not substantial during the
preceding license period, a second stage of the hearing ensued, in which the incumbent and the
challengers competed for the license. 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d at 426, 18 P & F
RADIO REG. 2D AT 1905.
10. 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d at 426, 18 P & F" RADIO REG. 2D at 1906. The
Commission did not state that the challengers might appear only for this purpose in the policy
statement. However, this was made clear in a decision involving the 1970 Policy Staiement in
which the FCC indicated that the only relevant evidence in the initial stage of a proceeding was
the performance of the incumbent-and not the proposed program policies of a challenging
applicant. RKO General, Inc. (WNAC-TV), 23 F.C.C.2d 448,451 (1970).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972:115

the FCC determined that the "substantial service" test had been met,
the license would be renewed without any hearing at all on the qualifications of the challengers.11
Comprehensive national regulation of broadcasting began with
the Radio Act of 1927,12 which established an elaborate licensing
system. Licenses were granted for a period of no longer than three
years, 3 after which a renewal hearing was required if the licensee
wished to continue in operation. 4 Both initial and renewal applications for licenses were approved only if granting the license would
serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity."' 5 To guard
against monopoly control of the broadcasting industry, the Act provided that no licensee was to have any interest in the nature of a
property right 6 as the result of the granting of a license.' The Radio
Act was later included under Title III of the Communications Act of
1934,1 which continued the same objectives of government regulation. 9
The FCC may grant without hearing an application for a license
submitted under the Communications Act if it determines that the
grant would serve the public interest."0 If, however, the Commission
is unable to make such a determination, or if a material question of
fact is presented, the application must be designated for hearing. 2
11. The FCC did not state that no hearing would be held. However, after the grant of the
incumbent's application, the challenger's application would be moot. See notes 27-30 infra.
12. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
13. 44 Stat. 1166.
14. Id. at 1167.
15. Id. at 1166-67.
16. This is in contrast to, for example, licenses granted under the Federal Power Act, which
are granted for "a period not exceeding fifty years," 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1970); if the United
States determines to assume the operation of power facilities upon the expiration of a license,
the licensee is entitled to reimbursement to the extent of his net investment and for reasonable
damages resulting from the takeover. Id. § 807(a).
17. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 331 (1945); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). The intent of Congress that a license convey no
property right is even clearer in the Communications Act of 1934. See Communications Act of
1934, §§ 301, 304, 307(d), 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307(d) (1970).
18. S. RaP. No. 681, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). The provisions of the Radio Act were
included under §§ 301-29 of the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-29 (1970).
19. "In its essentials the Communications Act of 1934 derives from the Federal Radio Act
of 1927 . . . [b]ut the objectives of the legislation have remained substantially unaltered since
1927." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
20. Communications Act of 1934, § 309(a), 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). Section 309 was amended in 1952, 1954, 1956, 1960, and
1964. The amendments dealt primarily with procedure, but did not in any way limit the right
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Prior to such a hearing the Commission is required to notify the
applicant and all other parties in interest, specifying with particularity
the matters in issue. 22 The ensuing hearings are full hearings, in which
both the applicant and all other parties in interest are permitted to
participate.3 If two or more applications for the same license are
involved, the Commission may hold separate hearings on the applications, or it may consolidate the applications and decide them both in
24
one comparative hearing.
Whether or not the applicant has a right to a comparative hearing
is primarily a question for administrative rather than judicial determination.2 In FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 2 the Supreme Court
reversed a decision instructing the FCC not to hold a comparative
hearing, ruling that whether applications should be considered separately or in a comparaive hearing was a matter entrusted by Congress
to the agency's discretion. In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,27 however, the Court indicated that Congress had placed limits on this
discretionary power. In Ashbacker the FCC had before it two mutually exclusive applications. 2 The Commission granted one application and scheduled the other for a hearing. The Court held that under
these circumstances the granting of one application without a hearing
on the other effectively deprived the loser of his statutory right to a
hearing. 29 Although the holding in Ashbacker was clearly based on the
Court's reading of congressional purpose, as reflected in section
309(e) of the Communications Act," subsequent lower court decisions
to a hearing as held in Ashbacker, see note 6 supra. Compare Communications Act of 1934,
ch. 652, § 309, 48 Stat. 1085 with Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715; Act of Sept.
13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, § 4(a), 74 Stat. 889-92; and Act of May 14, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-306, 78 Stat. 193.
22. Communications Act of 1934, § 309(e), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970).
23. Id. The burden of proof is upon the applicant. The Act does not distinguish between an
initial applicant and an incumbent seeking renewal; both bear the burden of proof and must
show that the granting of a license would satisfy the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Id. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a); see notes 38-42 infra and accompanying text.
24. See note 4 supra.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 288 U.S. 490 (1938). See generally I
DAVIS

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

§ 8.12.
309 U.S. 134 (1940).
326 U.S. 327 (1945).
Id. at 328. See note 4 supra for a discussion of the term "mutually exclusive."
326 U.S. at 333.
47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970).
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have indicated that the right to a comparative hearing may be based
3
on due process considerations as well. '
Even though the right to a hearing for incumbents and newcomers
is founded upon the same statutory provisions, 3 FCC decisions have
revealed a strong pro-incumbent bias. In Hearst Radio, Inc.3 1 the
Commission found that the qualifications of the challenger were superior to those of the incumbent in several important respects, but
nevertheless awarded the license to the incumbent. The determinative
factor cited by the Commission was the clear advantage of continuing
the established service, as compared with the risks inherent in allowing the challenger to carry out proposed programming which, at least
potentially, might never materialize in the proposed form. 35 In
Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp.3" the Commission suggested that
an applicant's past performance is the most reliable indication of
what can be expected in the future, disregarded the challenger's apparent superiority in comparative criteria, and renewed the incumbent's license. Although the Communications Act did not prescribe
licensing standards other than the public interest, convenience, or
necessity, 3s Hearst and Wabash Valley suggested that the Commis31. In Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 349 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1965), the court stated that
due process is denied an applicant when a competiig application on mutually exclusive subject
matter is heard and granted because a decision on an essential factor in the first application
(the need for service on the proposed route) is based on a hearing at which the original applicant
is not represented. Id. at 590. See also National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.
1952).
32. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
33. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
34. Id. at 1179-81.
35. Id. at 1183.
36. 35 F.C.C. 677, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 573 (1963).
37. Id. at 684-85, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 584 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Bartley).
38. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The public interest, convenience, or necessity
standard has consistently been held applicable to both original and renewal applications. Section
307(d) of the Communications Act of 1934 amended § II of the Radio Act (which had set forth
the public interest, convenience, or necessity standard) by adding:
• . . but action of the Commission with reference to the granting of such application for
the renewal of a license shall be limited to and governed by the same considerations and
practice which affect the granting of original applications. 48 Stat. 1084 (1934).
The 1952 amendments to the Communications Act, see note 21 supra, deleted this language,
but retained the public interest, convenience or necessity standard. Apparently, this deletion was
intended to guard against the possibility that the incumbent's past broadcast record could not
be considered at all in deciding his request for renewal. Cf. 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393,398, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901, 1912-13.
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sion was slowly developing more specific criteria on a case-by-case
basis. 39 These criteria were summarized in the 1965 "Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings." 4 The FCC described the
statement as a general review of the criteria governing the disposition
of comparative hearing cases.4" According to this statement, the criteria of primary importance were the best possible service to the
public and maximum diffusion of control over the media of mass
communication.42 More specific criteria to be utilized in determining
the best possible service were: full-time participation in station operation by owners;43 adequacy of the proposed program service for local
needs; past broadcasting experience; technically efficient use of frequency; and character.44 Originally this policy statement was applicable only to new applications,4" but the Commission soon indicated
that it would also govern license renewal proceedings.4" In the controversial 1969 WHDH decision 47 the Commission utilized the 1965 criteria for the first time in denying renewal to a licensee. In the same
decision the FCC also appeared to reject the pro-incumbent position
taken in Hearst and Wabash Valley, concluding that those decisions
placed an extraordinary burden on new applicants and that the public
interest would be better served if prior service record and the continu48
ance of established service were not given such great weight.
39. This view is confirmed by other FCC actions. See, e.g., the discussion in ScrippsHoward Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677, 680 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951);
Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
40. 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901. See generally Grunewald, Should the
Comparative Hearing Process Be Retained in Television Licensing?, 13 AM. U. L. REv. 164
(1964); Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor'sFoot, 47 GEo. L.J. 655 (1959).
41. 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1907.
42. Id. at 393, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1908.
43. The "integration" of ownership and management is considered important because an
owner who is a full-time participant in the station's operation will necessarily also be a local
resident, and thus more attuned to local needs than an "absentee" owner. See id. at 396, 5 P &
F RADIO REG. 2D at 1909-10.
44. Id. at 395-99, 5 P & F RADIo REG. 2D at 1909-13.
45. Id. at 393 n.l, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1907 n.1.
46. See Seven League Prods., Inc. (WIII), I F.C.C.2d 1597, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1091
(1965).
47. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 411 (1969), affd sub nom.,
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, - U.S.
-(1971).
48. 16 F.C.C.2d at 9-10, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 423-24. It is possible that this
construction of WHDH exaggerates the importance of the decision. In denying the station's
petition for reconsideration, see 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 16 P & F RADIO REG 2D 185 (1969), the FCC
revealed that WH DH had been treated as a new applicant, rather than as an incumbent, because
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The WHDH decision was widely criticized." Industry opposition 0
resulted in the introduction of a bill in the Senate which would have
drastically revised the hearing procedures for renewal applications."
Proposed in the bill was a two-stage hearing procedure. In the first
stage the question of renewal was to be considered prior to and exclusive of the applications of any challengers." If the past performance
of the incumbent was found to have been in the public interest, the
of certain sui generis considerations. Although WHDH had operated WHDH-TV for nearly
12 years, that operation was largely conducted under a series of temporary authorizations, while
the right to operate the station for a regular three-year period was under challenge. WHIDH,
Inc., id, at 872-73, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 185, 203-04 (1969). For a detailed account of
WHDH's license problems, see Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protectionof Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 368 (1970).
49. See, e.g., $3 Billion in Stations Down the Drain?, bROADCASTING, Feb. 3, 1969, at 19;
Jaffe, WH DH: The FCCand BroadcastingLicense Renewal, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1969).
50. WHDH was viewed in some quarters as a radical departure from previous law which
threatened the stability of the broadcasting industry because large financial investments made
in the expectation of "automatic" renewal now seemed in jeopardy. See the articles cited in
note 49 supra for discussions of these misgivings.
The industry's main fear may have been that the WHDH decision would eventually lead to
a rule excluding newspaper owners from controlling radio and television stations. Indeed,
WHDH was ranked last among the competing applicants on the criterion of diversification
because all its stock was owned by a local newspaper, and this was a significant factor in the
loss of its license. The spectre of a broad rule excluding ownership of broadcast facilities by
newspaper interests was clearly raised in Commissioner Johnson's concurring opinion. 16
F.C.C.2d at 27, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 438-39. Commissioner Johnson pointed out that
in America's eleven largest cities every VHF television station was owned by a broadcasting
network, multiple station owner, or major local newspaper. Although purporting to take no
position on the merits of continued newspaper ownership of broadcasting properties in markets
where there are competing media, and thereby clearly indicating disapproval of newspaper
ownership of broadcasting stations where there are no competing media, he stated that it would
be "healthy" to have at least one locally owned station in these major markets. For criticism
of Commissioner Johnson's views see Jaffe, supra note 49, at 1697-99.
51. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Several bills with the same provisions were
introduced in the House. See, e.g., H.R. 11073, 11509, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). The bills
provided:
That section 309(a) shall be amended by adding the following after the final sentence
thereof: Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the Commission, in acting upon
any application for renewal of a broadcast license filed under section 308, may not
consider the application of any other person for the facilities for which renewal is sought.
If the Commission finds upon the record and representations of the licensee that the
public interest, convenience and necessity has been and would be served thereby, it shall
grant the renewal application. If the Commission determines after a hearing that the
grant of the application of a renewal applicant would not be in the public interest,
convenience and necessity, it shall deny such application, and application for construction permits by other parties may then be accepted, pursuant to section 308, for the
broadcast service previously licensed to the renewal applicant whose renewal was denied.
52. S. 2004,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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Commission was to grant renewal. 5 3 The filing of competing applications was to be permitted only if renewal was denied, and hearings
on such applications would have been held separately during the second phase of the procedure.5 4 Although a large number of Congressmen announced their support of the measure, the bill was bitterly
attacked in Senate hearings by a number of citizens' groups,55 and was
not enacted. During the period this congressional proposal was being
considered, the FCC, without a formal rule-making proceeding" or
other advance notice, issued the 1970 "Policy Statement Concerning
57
Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants.1
The policy enunciated therein effectively achieved the result sought in
the Senate since the issue of renewal was decided on the ground of the
incumbent's "substantial service" to the public determined in a hearing prior to and exclusive of any consideration of the qualifications
of challengers. 58 According to the Commission, however, the policy
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The main objections to the bill, as stated by the
citizens' groups, were that it was racially discriminatory, effectively excluded minorities from
media ownership in large communities, and hampered community efforts to improve local
television programming. See, e.g., Statement of Rev. Douglas Moore, id. at 611-12. The timing
of the announcement of the FCC 1970 Policy Statement, see notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text, also contributed substantially to the demise of the Senate bill.
56. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), requires agencies
to follow certain procedures in all cases of administrative "rule making," including the publication of advance notice in the Federal Register, and providing an opportunity for interested
persons to participate. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970), defines a "rule" as "the whole or a part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency." Exempted from the rule-making requirements are "interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."
Id. § 553(a)(3)(A). The Commission contended that the 1970 Policy Statement was a "general
statement of policy" and therefore was not subject to the procedural safeguards described in
§ 4oftheAPA. Id. § 553.
57. 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901 (1970).
58. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text. It is not necessarily true, however, that
the "public interest" and "substantial service" tests are the same. A possible explanation of
the 1970 Policy Statement is that the Commission tried to enact the bill as the Commission
would have liked to have had it drafted. According to this explanation, the "public interest"
test incorporated in the bill, because of the gloss placed on the words "public interest" in many
FCC cases, could be interpreted to require nothing more than marginal service, while the FCC's
"substantial service" test was susceptible to a more flexible interpretation and could be used
by the Commission to insure that incumbents provided the maximum service possible in their
particular situations. See 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d at 425 n.1, 18 P & F RADIO REG.
2D at 1904 n. I. Although this view can be attacked as self-serving and "pro-industry," the
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was designed to balance the 5advantages of competition and stability
in the broadcasting industry. 1
In Citizens Communications Center0 the court determined ini-

tially that the case was both reviewable and ripe for review.

1

The

court noted not only that the petitioners would suffer extreme hard-

ship if review were withheld,6 2 but pointed out that the 1970 Policy
Statement was self-executing and had deterred the filing of a single

competing application for a television license for more than a year.6
Concern with the virtual non-existence of competition in the broad-

casting industry since the issuance of the 1970 statement is reflected
throughout the court's opinion, and is grounded in part in the court's
conviction that a statutory presumption favoring incumbents does not
exist:
The Communications Act itself says nothing about a presumption in favor of
incumbent licensees at renewal hearings; nor is an inability to displace operating broadcasters inherent in government management. . . .'
arguments for continuity and stability in the broadcasting industry do have some foundation.
If a licensee cannot expect to retain his license for more than three years, he may be unwilling
to make an investment sufficient to properly serve the public, but rather be intent primarily on
making a quick profit. Similarly, any long-range plans for improvement or innovation would
be very difficult to undertake. The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the court's conclusion
that the "public interest" and "substantial service" tests were substantially identical is persuasive because both phrases are sufficiently vague and broad to permit the FCC to arrive at
identical conclusions under either test.
59. 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d at 424-25, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1904. The
Commission's concern with the stability of the industry does not seem justified. In the year
following the WHDH opinion only eight out of approximately 250 television license renewals
were challenged. STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE CoMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, STAFF STUDY, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., at 18 n.101 (1970).

60. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
61. Id. at 1205. The Commission argued that the policy statement merely established general guidelines to be applied in the future, and hence was interlocutory and not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2342(l) (1970) and 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970). The court held that
even if the statement were interlocutory, it was reviewable immediately because of the allegation
that the FCC's adherence to it had deprived the petitioners of their right to a full comparative
hearing. 447 F.2d at 1205. See Chicago &S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 112-13 (1948); Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
62. In Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), the Court indicated that the
ripeness of a controversy depended upon "the fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Here, as the Court noted, the issues
were "'purely legal.'" 447 F.2d at 1205. Hardship was inherent in the situation, the Court
held, because the expense of preparing a competitive television application could rise to as much
as $250,000. Id. at n.7.

63. 447 F.2d at 1205.
64. Id. at 1207.
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The court viewed the FCC decision in WHDH 5 as consistent with the
Communications Act, and as "[i]ndicating a swing away from Hearst
and Wabash Valley, in practical if not theoretical terms . ... ""
Undoubtedly aware that the FCC's 1970 Policy Statement constituted a reversal of the WHDH approach, the court was very explicit
in assessing the 1970 statement in unfavorable terms:
[It] administratively "enacts" what the Pastore bill sought to do. The Statement's test for renewal, "substantial service," seems little more than a semantic substitute for the bill's test, "public interest," and the bill's two-stage
hearing, the second stage being dependent on the incumbent's failing the test,
is not significantly different from the Statement's summary judgment ap67
proach.

In holding the FCC's new approach invalid the court pointed out
first, that while Ashbacker had involved original rather than renewal
applications, there could be no doubt that the principle involved extended to renewals also, and comparative hearings were, therefore,
mandatory for both types of proceedings."8 Furthermore, the court
determined that a comparative hearing could not be limited to a single
issue, but rather "must take into account all the characteristics which
indicate differences, and reach an over-all relative determination upon
an evaluation of all factors . . . ."' For this reason, it indicated, the
hearing granted by the Commission under the 1970 Policy Statement,
which purported to be a comparative hearing limited to the single
issue of the performance of the incumbent, did not qualify as a comparative hearing at all, for it did not give challengers any opportunity
to demonstrate comparative superiority. 70 The court concluded, therefore, that the 1970 Policy Statement effectively denied challengers a
comparative hearing, in violation of the Ashbacker doctrine.
Although the court purports not to be "impinging at all upon the
Commission's substantive discretion in weighing factors and granting
licenses,"'" it is clear that its holding not only directs that a hearing
65. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
66. 447 F.2d at 1208. The pro-incumbent bias in Hearst and Wabash Valley is discussed in
notes 33-37 supraand accompanying text.
67. 447 F.2d at 1210. But see note 58 supra.
68. 447 F.2d at 1211. The Ashbacker case is discussed at notes 27-30supra and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 1212 quoting, Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
70. 447 F.2d at 1213. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
71. 447 F.2d at 1212 n.33, 1213.
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be held, but also requires that certain substantive factors-other than
the past performance of the incumbent-be considered at such hearings. The court recognized that the incumbent's prior performance is
properly a significant factor in renewal proceedings, and, indeed, acknowledged that a greater burden may be placed upon new applicants
who wish to displace an established licensee.12 Nevertheless, new applicants, it reasoned, must be granted at least an opportunity to show
superiority.
The court was sympathetic to the Citizens Communications Center's argument that the FCC's adoption of the 1970 Policy Statement
necessitated a rule-making procedure in accordance with section 4 of
the APA. stating that the Commission's contention to the contrary
was, "to say the least, remarkable," and that there was a serious
question concerning the propriety of the Commission's action.13 However, the court declined to decide this issue. Judge MacKinnon, in a
concurring opinion, projected the argument concerning lack of a proper rule-making procedure one step further, suggesting that the
change effected by the 1970 Policy Statement could not be accomplished without amendment of the Communications Act.74
To the extent that the decision in Citizens Communications Center
makes explicit the applicability of the Ashbacker doctrine to FCC
renewal proceedings, it represents an extension of existing law, The
court's willingness to take this step, and its willingness to risk intruding upon the Commission's authority to establish and apply substantive criteria were both fundamental to its decision.75 Certain difficulties were inherent in the FCC position, even from an administrative
point of view because the "procedure" set forth in the 1970 Policy
Statement overlapped the substantive criteria elaborated in the 1965
Policy Statement.7 ' The 1965 statement, for example, indicated that
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1213.
447 F.2d at 1204 n.5.
Id. at 1215.
See note notes 69, 71 supra and accompanying text. While the court perhaps risked

invading matters delegated to the discretion of the FCC in this portion of its opinion, it is
probably more accurate to say that it looked beyond the form of the Commission's actions in
order to ascertain their substance.
76. The Commission's lack of certainty with respect to the proper characterization of the
1970 Policy Statement was aptly summarized by the court:
In order to avoid conflict with (Ashbacker] . . ., the Commission characterizes
Ashbacker as dealing only with "procedure," and distinguishes the Policy Statement as
being in effect substantive. Then, caught between Scylla and Charybdis, the Commission
turns around and calls the Policy Statement "procedural rather than . . . substantive"
in order to avoid conflict with Section 4 of the APA. 447 F.2d at 1204 n.5.
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the substantive criteria of primary importance in licensing decisions
were the "best practicable service to the public" and maximum diffusion of control of mass communications media. 77 Consideration of the
"best practicable service" factor would be essentially eliminated
under the 1970 Policy Statement, since the consideration of competing applications on the merits would be initially precluded. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a decision on the "best practicable service"
would ever be reached when only "substantial service" was required
for renewal. Similarly, to the extent that there is undesirable concentration in the industry, any significant flow of newcomers would be
impossible under a policy that favored incumbents so heavily. The
fact that the FCC adopted the 1970 Policy Statement in the face of
these contradictions may illustrate its susceptibility to industry pressure.
In concluding the opinion the court stated: "[o]ur decision today
restores healthy competition by repudiating a . . . policy which is

unreasonably weighted in favor of the licensees it is meant to regulate
...
. ,,7 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
no doubt overstated the effect its decision is likely to have on the
communications industry. It would be quite possible, for example, for
the FCC to continue the practices established by the 1970 Policy
Statement under the guise of individual decisions on the merits after
79
pro forma hearings, without articulating the policy it is following.
Were this to happen, it would not only be very difficult to detect, but
very likely would also be beyond the reach of judicial intervention. °
Despite the potential for FCC circumvention it is difficult not to
agree with the court's decision. In view of the fact that there are some
77. See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.
78. 447 F.2d at 1214.
79. In Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 550
(D.C. Cir. 1969), the same court found that the FCC had exercised bad faith with respect to an
earlier court decision involving the same parties, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also the
discussion in 1970 Duke Project 207-09.
80. Such a course of events seems not entirely unlikely in view of pro-incumbent decisions
by the FCC in the past. See. e.g., Star Stations of Indiana, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 991 (1969) (licensee
already on probation for irresponsible conduct committed fraud on advertisers; license renewed); Herman C. Hall, I I F.C.C.2d 344 (1968) (licensee proposed no news or public affairs
programming; license renewed). See also Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License
Renewal Process:An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968) (statement of Commissioners Cox and Johnson); Renewal of Standard Broadcast and Television Licenses, I I F.C.C.2d
809, 810 (1968) (dissents of Commissioners Cox and Johnson).
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persuasive reasons to favor incumbent licensees in renewal proceedings, the decision in Citizens Communications Center appropriately
permits the FCC some leeway to impose a greater burden on challengers."1 In the face of a statutory provision that does not favor incumbents,82 however, there are tangible limits placed upon this authority
which, failing amendment of the Communications Act, are inescapable. If the short period of license effectiveness does indeed pose a great
problem for the radio and television industry, it is clear that amendment of the statute is a more efficacious approach to solving the
problem than the stretching of administrative authority beyond its
proper limits. No compelling reason exists why an amendment to the
Communications Act need be destructive of competition, as the
amendment proposed in the Senate subsequent to the WHDH
decision would have been,' An alternative which might be considered
is an extension of the period of license effectiveness.' Such an approach has the possibility of resulting in greater industry stability,
without distortion of the administrative process or a total stifling of
competition.

IV.

INTERVENTION

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE CHARGING PARTY IN UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS

Courts have limited the procedural rights of charging parties in
unfair labor practice proceedings by interpreting the National Labor
Relations Act' to protect only public rights, thereby precluding any
8 1.
82.
83.
84.

See notes 58, 72 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 64 supra.
See note 51 supra.
The extension of the licensing period to, for example, eight or ten years, might have the

effect of making licensees too secure in their positions to create a sufficient incentive to improve
broadcasting quality. However, if such a change were combined with a mandatory public
hearing halfway through the license period solely on the acceptability of the performance of the
licensee, with loss of license occurring if "substantial service," or some other appropriate
standard of service, has not been rendered, this problem could be avoided. A hearing of this
nature, while of the kind declared improper in the Citizens Communications Center decision,
might be appropriate as an interim proceeding under an amended communications statute.
I. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§§

151-68 (1970).

